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GANTNER

v.

GANTNER

[39 C.2d

[So F. No. 18573. In Bank. July 11, 1952.]

NEILMA BAILLIEU GANTNER, Respondent,
VALLEJO GANTNER, Appellant.

V.

[1] Divorce-Custody of Children-Modification of Award-Discretion.-Trial court has broad discretion in matters pertaining to change of custody of children of divorced parents,
and its decision will not be reversed by an appellate court
unless the record clearly shows an abuse of that discretion.
[2] ld.-Custody of Children-Modi1l.cation of Award-Evidence.
-Trial court's determination on hearing of divorced husband's
motion for modification of custody provisions of decree that
it is to the best interests of the children to remain with their
mother is sustained by testimony that the children were ,
mentally and physically healthy, that the relationship between
them and their mother was one of love and companionship, and
that they received proper care and attention.
[3] ld.-Custody of Children-Modi1l.cation of Award-Preference
of Children.-It is proper to deny request of divorced husband,
seeking modification of custody provisions of decree, that
court ask children of parties which parent they preferred,
where the children, who were aged 11 and 9, .did not appear
to the court to be of sufficient age to form an intelligent
preference for one parent over the other (Civ. Code, § 138(1»,
and where such question would thus have had little if any
probative value and would have served only to subject the
children to serious emotional disturbance.
[4] ld.-Custody of Children-Modi1l.cation of Award-Circumstances Justifying.-Wbile trial court has continuing jurisdiction to modify custody provisions of a divorce decree (Civ.
Code, § 138), to justify a modification there must be a change
of circumstances arising after the original decree is entered,
or at least a showing that the facts were unknown to the
party urging them at the time of the prior order and could
not with due diligence have been ascertained.
[6] ld.-Custody of Children-Modification of Award-Evidence.
-In determining whether circumstances have changed to
[1] See Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. (1944 Rev.), Divorce andSeparation, § 140.4; Am.Jur., Divorce and Separation, § 684.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Divorce, §287(4); [2,5-7,10] Divorce, § 287 (6); [3,4] Divorce, § 287; [8] Appeal and Error, § 889;
[9] Trial, §380; [11] Trial, §25; [12] Divorce, §286, [13,14]
Appeal and Error, § 1230; [15] Evidence, § 273; [16] Appeal and
Error, § 1230(3).
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warrant modification of the custody provisions of a divorce
decree, the court necessarily considers the facts established
in the former proceeding as a basis for comparison.
[6] ld.-Custody of Children--ModiAcation of Award-Evidence.
-Evidence of wife's conduct preceding entry of interlocutory
divorce decree is properly rejected as nonresponsive to the
issues in proceeding to modify custody provisions of decree.
[7] ld.-Custody of Children-ModiAcation of Award-Evidence.
-Modification of divorce decree so that children of parties
could live with father only during parts of Christmas holidays
and school vacations and he could visit them only on Sundays
"from breakfast time to bed time" is sustained by father's
testimony that children were emotionally disturbed by being
shifted from one home to the other on weekends, and by
mother's testimony that they were disrespectful to her after
visiting their father.
[8] Appeal-Briefs-Facts Outside Record.-Statements of counsel in briefs are not part of the record on appeal, and may
not be relied on to show alleged bias and prejudice of the
trial judge where no affidavits were filed to support such
statements and the alleged misconduct does not appear on the
face of the record.
[9] Trial-Findings-Opinion of Judge as Impeaching Findings.It is proper to refuse to admit in evidence the memorandum
opinion of the trial judge in a prior proceeding where the
findings of fact and conclusions of law are admitted, since
the findings supersed~ such opinion.
[10] Divorce-Custody of Children-ModiAcation of Award-Evidence.-On hearing of a divorced husband's motion for modification of custody provisions of decree, it is proper to refuse
to allow him to ask a witness whether he had a good infiuence
on the children where his former wife conceded that his
relation with the children was one of love and devotion.
[11] Trial-Conduct of Judge.-A. trial judge is not a mere
passive spectator at the trial, and within reasonable limits
it is not only his right but his duty clearly to bring out the
facts so that important functions of his office may be fairly
and justly performed.
[12] Divorce-Custody of Children-Removal of Children from
JuriBdiction.-Trial court may permit divorced mother having
custody of children of parties to remove them to a foreign
country if it concludes that best interests of children would
he promoted by such removal, either permanently or temporarily, and if its decision is supported by sufficient evidence.
[12] 'Order in divorce or separation proceeding concerning removal of child from jurisdiction, note, 154 A.L.R. 552.
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[13] Appeal-Rule Under Code Civ. Proc., § 956a.-Purpose of
Code Civ. Proc., § 956a, providing that appellate courts may
take additional evidence of facts occurring prior to decision
of appeal and may give or direct entry of any judgment or
order as the case may require, is to permit an appellate court
to remedy defects in the record to the end that the judgment
or order appealed from may be affirmed and further litigation
terminated.
[14] ld.-Rule Under Code Civ. Proc., § 956a.-Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 956a, was not intended to convert appellate tribunals into
triers of facts, and may not be invoked by a divorced mother
having custody of children of parties to have a reviewing
court enter an order permitting her to remove the children
to a foreign country where this question was never decided by
the trial court and there are no findings of fact on that issue.
[15] Evidence--Xearsay-Evidence at Former Trial.-Where trial
on issue of taking children of divorced parents to a foreign
country for a vacation trip has not been completed, but only
suspended by appeal from order denying modification of the
divorce decree, use of evidence at the former hearing does not
come within rule that evidence at a former trial is usually
inadmissible at a second trial.
U6] Appeal-Rule Under Code Civ. Proc., § 956a-Taking Evidence.-Motion requesting Supreme Court to take additional
evidence under Code Civ. Proc., § 956a, to support affirmance of
order denying modification of final decree, will be denied
where there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the
findings and the order of the trial court.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of the City
and County of San Francisco denying motion to modify
custody provisions of divorce judgment. Herbert C. Kaufman,
Judge. Affirmed; motions to make a special order and to take
additional evidence under Code Civ. Proc., § 956a, denied.
Morris Lowenthal and Juliet Lowenthal for Appellant.
Young, Rabinowitz & Chouteau, Harry S. Young and John
E. Anderton for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Neilma and Vallejo Gantner were married in 1941. Two children were born of the marriage,
Vallejo and Carillo, now aged 11 and 9. On August 9, 1949,
the trial court entered an interlocutory decree granting Neilma
a divorce and awarding Nailma and Vallejo joint legal custody of the children. Neilma was given physical custody of
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the children subject to Vallejo's right to visit them and to
havc them with him several weekends each month. Neither
party appealeu. The final divorce decree contained the same
custody provisions as the interlocutory decree.
On April 17, 1951, Vallejo filed a notice of motion requesting that the custody provisions be modified to give him
physical custody of the children. The motion was heard
before the same judge who had heard the divorce action.
The court found that it was in the best interests of the
children for them to remain in Neilma's custody and denied
the motion. It also modified the decree, limiting Vallejo's
right to have the children with him and his right to visitation. The present appeal followed.
[1] Vallejo contends that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to transfer custody to him. The trial
court has broad discretion in such matters, and its decision
will not be reversed or modified by an appellate court unless
the record clearly shows an abuse of that discretion. (Prouty
v. Prouty, 16 Ca1.2d 190, 191 [105 P.2d 295]; Foster v.
Foster, 8 Cal.2d 719, 730 [68 P.2d 719]; cases collected in
9 Cal.Jur. 798.)
[2] There is abundant testimony to support the trial
court's determination that it is to the best interests of the
children to remain with Neilma. Witnesses testified that the
children were mentally and physically healthy, that the relationship between Neilma and the children was one of love
and companionship, and that they received proper care and
attention. Val1ejo introduced considerable testimony to the
effect that Neilma was not taking proper care of the children. The trial court did not accept· Vallejo's version of
the facts and resolved conflicts in the evidenee in favor of
NeHma. (Foster v. Foster, supra; Busk v. Busk, 81 Cal.
App.2d 695, 699 [185 P.2d 38].)
Vallejo also contends that the trial court erred in several
rulings regarding admission and rejection of evidence.
[3] The parties stipulated that the trial judge could privately interview the children in chambers. Afterwards the
judge stated for the record that the children appeared equally
devoted to both parents. He stated that the boys informed
him that they preferred living in the country to living in
the city, but did not express any preference for one parent
over the other. Neilma lives in the country and Vallejo lives
in the city. Apparently fearing that the court might give
undue weight to the children's preference for the country,
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Vallejo requested the court to ask the children "in open
court if necessary" which parent they preferred. The request was dt'nied. No error appears in this ruling. The
court pointed out that little weight would be given to the
children '8 preference, since they did not appear to him to
be of sufficirnt age to form an intelligent preference for one
parent over the other. (Civ. Code, § 138(1)). The question proposed by Vallejo would thus have had little if any
probative value and would have served only to subject the
children to serious emotional disturbance.
Vallejo contends that the trial court improperly rejected
his offer to prove that during the marriage Neilma had slapped
the children and had stated that she did not want the re- I
sponsibility of caring for them. Some of the evidence offered .
had been presented at the 1949 trial of the divorce action;
the remainder had not on the advice of Vallejo's attorney.
At that trial the court rejected Vallejo's attack on Neilma's
character and found that she was "a fit and proper person
to have the joint legal custody, care and physical custody
of said minor children." No appeal was taken from the
1949 judgment.
[4] In divorce actions the trial court has continuing jurisdiction to modify the custody provisions of the divorce decree. (Civ. Code, § 138.) "But this does not mean the
parties to such litigation may after a court has once heard
evidence upon the subject of their fitness and ruled upon
the question, immediately again invoke the powers of the
court to have it inquire into the same or other facts existing
at the time of or prior to the former decree. Such holding
would lay a foundation for interminable and vexatious litigation. The rule is stated to be that to justify a modification
there must be a change of circumstances arising after the
original decree is entered, or at least a showing that the facts
were unknown to the party urging them at the time of the
prior order, and could not with due diligence have been ascertained." (Foster v. Foster, 8 Cal.2d 719, 727 [68 P.2d 719],
quoting from Olson v. Olson, 95 Cal.App. 594, 597 [272 P.
1113] ; accord: Munson v. Munson, 27 Ca1.2d 659, 666-667
[166 P.2d 268] ; Prouty v. Prouty, 16 Ca1.2d 190, 193 [l05
P.2d 295].) [5] In determining whether circumstances have
changed, however, the court necessarily considerEl the facts
established in the former proceeding as a basis for comparison.
(Crater v. Crater, 135 Cal. 633, 634 [67 P. 1049] ; Simmons
v. Simmons, 22 Cal.App. 448, 452 [134 P. 791].) [6] In
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the present case, the trial judge had presided at the former
trial and was therefore familiar with the circumstances then
existing. The findings of fact and conclusions of law at the
former trial were introduced in evidence. The evidence of
Neilma's conduct preceding entry of the interlocutory decree
was therefore properly rejected as nonresponsive to the issues
in the modification proceeding. (See Smith v. Smith, 85 Cal.
App.2d 428, 433 [193 P.2d 56] ; Valentine v. Valentine, 47
Cal.App.2d 438, 440 [118 P.2d 17]; cases collected in 9
A.L.R.2d 623.)
Vallejo next contends that the trial court abused its discretion in modifying the divorce decree so that the children could live with him only during parts of Christmas
holidays and school vacations and he could visit them only
on Sundays "from breakfast time to bed time."
[7] The evidence supports the modification. Vallejo himself testified that the children were emotionally disturbed by
being shifted from one home to the other on weekends. Neilma
testified that the children were disrespectful to her after
visiting Vallejo. Neilma also stated that when she disciplined
the children they would say "I '11 tell my father on you."
Vallejo states in his brief that a divided custody arrangement is unworkable and urges this court to award him undivided custody to end the "pulling and tugging by the
parents. " The same reasoning would apply on behalf of
NeUma. Some experts believe that divided custody is harmful to the welfare of children (Plant, The Psychiatrist Views
Children of Divorced Parents, 10 Law and Contemp. Prob.
807, 816) although others believe that barring exceptional
circumstances, children should continue their relations with
both parents. (Weinman, The Trial Judge Awards Custody,
10 Law and Contemp. Prob. 721, 728.) In each case, the
trial judge must determine what is in the best interests of
the children. The trial court in the present case could reasonably conclude from the evidence that a modification of the
custody arrangements was advisable. (See Cornwall v. Cornwall, 108 Cal.App.2d 95, 108 [238 P.2d 8].)
Vallejo contends that the trial judge was guilty of
bias and prejudice, an issue raised for the first time on appeal. Much of his argument is directed at matters not in
the rccord. Thus he alleges that "the trial judge ignored
appellant's witnesses on the first day and from then on . . .
he looked away from them and at the opposite wall all during their testimony, except when he occasionally tried to
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elicit from them something adverse to Vallejo." Again, he
asserts that "the trial judge, in his chambers, ridiculed all
of counsel's arguments as to the relevancy of the evidence
to be produced by Vallejo's witnesses and revealed a prejudicial attitude against Vallejo." No affidavits were filed to
support the statements in the brief. (Cf. Webber v. Webber,
33 Cal.2d 153, 164 [199 P.2d 934] [affidavits unnecessary
when misconduct of judge appears on face of record].)
[8] Statements of counsel in briefs are not part of the
record on appeal. (See Ware v. Security-F'irst Nat. Bank,
7 Ca1.2d. 604, 608 [61 P.2d 936] ; Lady v_ Barrett, 43 Cal.
App.2d 685, 687 [111 P.2d 702].) The question whether
the trial court was biased must therefore be determined
from matters appearing in the reporter's transcript.
[9] Vallejo relies on the trial court's refusal to admit
in evidence his memorandum opinion in the 1949 trial, allegedly "directly and unequivocally contrary to his whole
attitude in the 1951 proceedings." The court, however, admitted the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the
1949 action. It acted properly in refusing to admit the
memorandum opinion, since the findings superseded it. (See
Belger v. Sanchez, 137 Cal. 614, 618 [70 P. 738]; Williams
v. Kinsey, 74 Cal.App.2d 583, 600-601 [169 P.2d 487].)
[10] Vallejo states that the trial court refused to allow him
to ask a witness whether Vallejo had a good influence on
the children and declared, when Vallejo nevertheless attempted
to ask the question, "I am running the court and you are
going to mind the judge." Since NeHma had conceded that
Vallejo's relation with the children was one of love and
devotion, the court's ruling was correct. Its remark was
justified by counsel's attitude towards the court. The court
also properly stated, "Let's not have any repetition or cumulative evidence of the type we have had for the past twentyfour hours." There was no need to waste time hearing
testimony on facts conceded by the other party.
[11] The other charges of prejudice involve only adverse rulings or attempts by the trial judge to direct the
course of the trial. There is no evidence of misconduct. A
trial judge is not a mere passive spectator at the trial.
"Within reasonable limits, it is not only the right but the
duty of a trial judge to clearly bring out the facts so that
the important functions of his office may be fairly and justly
performed." (Estate of Dupont, 60 Cal.App.2d 276, 290
[140 P.2d 866], and cases cited therein.)
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Vallejo suggests that the trial judge's "own domestic
difficulties affected or confused his thinking on the subject"
and alleges that the trial judge was divorced in 1950. There
is nothing in the record to indicate that the personal life of
the trial judge led him to be biased against Vallejo.
In view of the attack on the trial judge, we think it
should be said that the record demonstrates that he impartially controlled the course of the trial. In cases relied upon
by Vallejo, such as Webber v. Webber, 33 Cal.2d 153 [199
P.2d 934], the trial judge had exhibited bias and prejudice throughout the trial of the issues. In the present case
nothing more is shown than that the trial judge refused to
allow Vallejo to develop immaterial matters and that the
judge did not believe Vallejo's evidence and accepted that
of N eilma and her witnesses.

~

Australian Vacation Order
In a proceeding consolidated for trial with the modification proceeding Neilma sought permission from the trial court
to take the children to Australia for a temporary vacation
trip to visit her relatives. Court permission was necessary
because the divorce decree contained a provision restraining
both parents from taking the children from the state. Neilma
offered evidence to support her motion and Vallejo vigorously opposed it. Before deciding the matter, however, the
trial court denied Vallejo's application for modification of
the divorce decree, and he immediately perfected the present
appeal. Since the appeal deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to pass on the vacation order, a matter necessarily
embraced within the appeal (Lerner v. Superior Court, 38
Cal.2d 676, 681 [242 P.2d 321]), we issued prohibition to
preclude the trial court's entering the Australian order during the pendency of the appeal. (Gantner v. Superior Court,
38 Ca1.2d 688 [242 P.2d 328].) We also denied Neilma's
application to this court for a similar order. (Gantner v.
Gantner, 38 Cal.2d 691 [242 P.2d 329].)
The trial court has therefore never entered an order on
the Australian vacation issue. In denying modification of
the custody provisions of the final decree, however, it stated
that it would be in the best interests of the children to travel
with their mother to Australia, that the filing of a cash bond
by the mother would be sufficient assurance that the removal
would be temporary, and that it would enter an order allow-

[
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ing the removal wh('nev('r the appellate court permitted an
order to be made.
Since the writ of prohibition in Gantner v. Superior Court,
supra, was issued for the pendency of the appeal only, our
affirmance here will remove the jurisdictional barrier and
allow the trial court, in its discretion, to enter an order allowing Neilma to take the children to Australia. Both Neilma
and Vallejo have requested this court to issue an advisory
ruling to the trial court informing it whether it may enter
the Australian order, even though there is no appeal before
us on this issue and no findings of fact or order to review.
[12] Vallejo contends that this court "must as a matter of law ... give a clear mandate to the trial court and
to Neilma that under no circumstances are the children to
be taken to Australia, this year or in any other. year, until
they desire to do so of their own free will and choice."
Insofar as this contention is based on the theory that the
trial court (in the absence of the pendency of an appeal)
lacks jurisdiction to allow Neilma to take the children from
the state, it is without merit. If the trial court concludes
that the best interests of the children would be promoted by
removal to Australia, either permanently or temporarily, and
its decision is supported by sufficient evidence, removal would
be proper. (Clarke v. Clarke, 35 Ca1.2d 259, 262 [217 P.2d
401]; Shea v. Shea, 100 Cal.App.2d 60, 63 [223 P.2d 32] ;
White v. White, 68 Cal.App.2d 650, 652 [157 P.2d 415] ;
Edwards v. Edwards, 191 Ore. 275, 280 [227 P.2d 975];
see cases collected in 154 A.L.R. 552.) Vallejo points out
that if Neilma is permitted to take the children to Australia,
the courts of that country would have jurisdiction to enter
a new custody award. (See Sampsell v. Superior Court, 32
Cal.2d 763, 779 [197 P.2d 739] ; In re B's Settlement, 1 Ch.
54 [1940].) He thus presents an argument that the trial
court must consider in passing on the vacation matter; but
does not show that the trial court could not under any circumstances allow the trip to be made. Vallejo also notes that
the 1949 divorce decree restrained Neilma from taking the
children from the state. The trial court, however, has continuing jurisdiction to modify custody provisions of divorce
decrees. (Civ. Code, § 138.)
Neilma has requested this court to enter its order in such
form as to permit the children to visit Australia "so that
the further function of the trial court herein shall be and
become purely ministerial in character." The only authority
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cited to authorize the requested order is section 956a of the
Code of Civil Procedure, providing that appellate courts may
take « additional evidence of or concerning facts occurring
at any time prior to the decision of the appeal and may
give or direct the entry of any judgment or order and
make such further or other order as the case may require."
[13] The purpose of section 956a is to permit an appellate
court to remedy defects in the record "to the end that the
judgment or order appealed from may be affirmed and further litigation terminated, and where otherwise under the old
practice the judgment or order would have to be reversed."
(Tupman v. Haberkern, 208 Cal. 256, 266 [280 P. 970] j see
also Johndrow v. Thomas, 31 Ca1.2d 202,207 [187 P.2d 681].) I
[14] But in asking this court to order the trial court to .
enter the Australian vacation order, Neilma is in effect seeking to obtain an order from this court modifying the final
divorce decree, a question never decided by the trial court.
There are no findings of fact on that issue. As pointed out
in the Tupman case, section 956a "was not intended to convert the appellate tribunals of the state into triers of fact."
(208 Cal. at pp. 269-270.) The motion to enter a special
order under section 956a cannot be granted.
Neilma argues that Vallejo will "foment other and further
vexatious litigation for the purpose of unduly delaying the
visit of the minor children to Australia." Her argument indicates a misconception of the scope of the decision in Gantner v. Superior Oourt, S'ltpra. We there held that during the
pendency of the appeal the trial court was deprived of jurisdiction to enter an order allowing the children to leave the
state. (Code Civ. Proc. § 946.) Nothing in that decision
deprives the trial court of jurisdiction to enter the Australian
vacation order merely because VaUejo may inaugurate new
attempts in the trial court to modify the custody decree. The
situation presented in Gantner v. Superior Oourt will recur
only if the trial court should pass on any such motion for
modification before it passes on the Australian order, so that
VaUejo would be enabled to perfect an appeal and remove
the cause from the jurisdiction of the trial court.
When the writ of prohibition is discharged following termination of this appeal, the court may decide the vacation
issue on the basis of the evidence previously presented and
such additional evidence as may be presented by the parties
regarding facts arising after issuance of the writ of prohibition, or facts that were unknown to the parties' at the
I
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former proceeding and that could not have been ascertained
with due diligence. [15] Since the trial on the vacation
issue has nev('r been completed, but only suspended by the
appeal from the order denying modification of the divorce
dl'cree, nse of the evidcnce at the 1951 hearing does not come
within thc rule that evidence at a former trial is usually
inadmissible at a second trial. (See Blache v. Blache, 37
Ca1.2d 531, 534-536 [233 P.2d 547].)
[16] Neilma has filed a motion requesting this court to
take additional evidence under section 956a to support an
affirmance of the order denying modification of the final decree. Since there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the findings and the order below, no purpose would
be served by granting the motion and it will therefore be
denied.
The order denying the motion to change custody is affirmed. The motions to make a special order and to take
additional evidence under section 956a are denied.

:)

Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., and
Spence, J., concurred.

)

